Investigating Accident InvestigationAn excellent and intriguing article by Dr. Nippin Anand that appeared in the March 2015 edition of The nautical Institute's Seaways magazine. A must read for anyone engaged in investigating marine accidents (or any industrial accident).
Enclosed Space Rescue - The Elephant in the RoomThis article , first published in the June 2021 edition of Seaways magazine, aims to help mariners understand and address one of the elements of the IMO requirements that I have called the ‘elephant in the room’: checking and use of rescue equipment and procedures.
Hard Data Versus Soft DataAppearing in the April 2021 edition of Seaways magazine, this article explores the push and pull of hard data versus soft data and reiterates the importance of collecting fatigue data, not from work/rest logs but from interviewing the witness.
Learning from other's accidentsIn this edition of The Navigator we can read several interesting articles on accident theory. In particular, the article on page 8 about learning from other's accidents penned by Capt. Paul Drouin.
CHIRP Maritime Annual Digest 2019This edition, now available here, is an unparalleled resource for marine accident or near miss reports that will inform, reinforce, and facilitate mariners in the application of their safety culture. A must read!!
USS John S. McCain collision (August 21 2017)While some very senior navy officials were rightfully called to account in the aftermath of this accident that cost the lives of 10 sailors, some of the low level individuals involved were sanctioned, prosecuted and shamelessly scapegoated in the Navy's desperate attempt to find guilty parties.
The NTSB report makes interesting reading but even more compelling is ProPublica's reporting on the accident here. One take-away from this accident: crew should be intimately familiar and trained in the use of their instruments, machines that are increasingly complex as in this case involving the utilisation of the combined helm-throttle-main engine control (Integrated Bridge and Navigation System). Data vs EvidenceSemantics are important. The use of the term ''data'' rather than ''evidence'' to ensure that a safety investigation stands on a solid, non-accusatory base is not a frivolous choice. But, debatably, the difference between ''data'' and ''evidence'' is greater than mere semantics.
Find out how by perusing the full article here as it appeared in the September 2017 issue of Seaways magazine. A Blueprint for Safety
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Making Reporting Happen
Just as a strong safety culture should form the nucleus of an organization’s approach to managing risks, so too must a robust reporting culture be the glue that helps bind the other elements together to form a systemic approach to reducing risks to levels that are as low as reasonably practicable.
Both CHIRP and MARS are active players in this reporting culture. We need your help so that the marine community becomes ever safer for all involved – consider getting involved as an ambassador, and send us your reports! Please click here for the article as it appeared in the February 2014 edition of Seaways.
Both CHIRP and MARS are active players in this reporting culture. We need your help so that the marine community becomes ever safer for all involved – consider getting involved as an ambassador, and send us your reports! Please click here for the article as it appeared in the February 2014 edition of Seaways.
USCG recommends an internal reporting systemAnother nod to a reporting culture, USCG Safety Alert 05-18.
Investigating for Fatigue
Fatigue is never the root cause of a casualty, but it can often play a key role. However, it is not always easy to pinpoint in the course of an investigation. What should an investigator look for, and how?
Please click >here for the full article, first published in Seaways magazine, July 2013 edition. |
M/V Beaumont aground on Cabo Negro, north Spanish coast. Click image for MAIB report 14/2013
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6 ON/6 OFF - The Debate That Never Should Have Been
This article wishes to put to rest, once and for all, the commonly acquiesced ''truth'' the that 6 On/6 Off watchkeeping system is an acceptable work practice.
It is hard to find another trade or industry that has its' members work on such a retrograde, counterproductive and outright dangerous schedule. Yet, this system is accepted by IMO, the International Labour Organization, flag state administrations, ship owners/operators and even watchkeepers as a matter of course.
First published in the April 2011 issue of the Nautical Institute's Seaways magazine, continue reading >here to find out why - and why this system is in fact at odds with the requirements of STCW itself - and why 6 On/6 Off should not be tolerated.
It is hard to find another trade or industry that has its' members work on such a retrograde, counterproductive and outright dangerous schedule. Yet, this system is accepted by IMO, the International Labour Organization, flag state administrations, ship owners/operators and even watchkeepers as a matter of course.
First published in the April 2011 issue of the Nautical Institute's Seaways magazine, continue reading >here to find out why - and why this system is in fact at odds with the requirements of STCW itself - and why 6 On/6 Off should not be tolerated.
Project Horizon — a wake-up call
This report, a multi-partner research initiative, presents the findings of Project Horizon – a research initiative to investigate the impact of watchkeeping patterns on the cognitive performance of seafarers. The project demonstrates conclusively the links between performance degradation and certain patterns of work. The project surpasses previous subjective fatigue studies, delivering validated, scientifically and statistically robust results that can be used to help determine safer working patterns.
Steering Gear PerformanceUndoubtedly, there are as many causes to a steering gear failure as there are humans who operate them or design elements that make up such a system. But equally true, many of these failures have alarmingly similar causes.
Please click >here for the full article, first published in Seaways magazine, December 2007 edition. |
Oily Water Separator - Indicator for Safety & Quality |
The Lifeboat Imbroglio
Year after year ship's crew are killed or injured during lifeboat drills or maintenance. It has been sadly observed that, since about 1980, there have probably been more deaths attributable to lifeboat accidents than lives saved due to using the lifeboat because of a stricken ship.
Please click >here for the article, first published in Seaways magazine, March 2007 edition. For other unfortunate lifeboat occurrences since 2007, see MAC's web site here.
Please click >here for the article, first published in Seaways magazine, March 2007 edition. For other unfortunate lifeboat occurrences since 2007, see MAC's web site here.
A Reporting Culture - Foundation for Safe Operations
Report your close call or accident!The Nautical Institute's ''Mariners' Alerting and Reporting Scheme'' (MARS) is primarily a confidential reporting system to allow full reporting of accidents (and near misses) without fear of identification or litigation. Click >here for more info!
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Reporting something that went wrong
often goes against our natural instincts. The crucial pivot is switching from a blame culture to what is increasing being called a just culture. A just culture is one where human error is considered inevitable. As such, an organization's policies and processes must be continually monitored, through a strong reporting culture and audit process, and hence improved to accommodate those errors.
Just as a strong safety culture should form the nucleus of an organization's approach to managing risks, so too must a robust reporting culture be the glue that helps bind the safety system together to form a systemic approach to reducing risks to levels that are as low as reasonably practicable. Each person is a critical piece of the safety puzzle. Please click >here for this article, first published in Seaways magazine, April 2013 edition. For additional information on reporting, see IMO's GUIDANCE ON NEAR-MISS REPORTING >here. |
Accident Analysis Models and Methods: Guidance for Safety Professionals
A wide range of accident investigation methods are available; each offering various theoretical and practical benefits and drawbacks. Furthermore, individuals engaged in accident investigation are subjected to various filters such budgetary and time constraints, which can influence their selection and usage of an analysis tool. For a better understanding of this dynamic, continue to read Peter Underwood's and Dr. Patrick Waterson's insightful paper on accident investigation techniques here.
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Brittle Fracture in ShipsBrittle Fracture in Ships - A Lingering Problem
This is an electronic version of an article published in Ships and Offshore Structures, Volume 1 No. 3, 2006. Please click >here for the article. Ships and Offshore Structures is available online at informaworld. Photo at left from Transportation Safety Board report M02L0021 - Hull Fracture Bulk Carrier Lake Carling. Please click >here for the information note presented to the IMO by Transport Canada at DE 48. For more on Bulk Carrier Safety, visit The Nautical Institute's knowledge forum >here |
The Influence of Government Regulations on Vessel EfficiencyThis excellent paper, presented at the Oceans Innovation Conference (2009) held at Victoria (B.C., Canada), is Mr Robert G. Allan's insightful take on how regulations can effect not only design and efficiency, but safety too - and not always for the better!
Please click >here to access Mr. Allan's paper. |
Happy Birthday ISMThe article is reproduced by kind permission of the author, Mr. Michael Molloy, and the American Club. To read this or other editions of Currents in their entirety
please visit the American Club >here (click on ''Publications'' + ''Currents''). Please click >here for Mr. Molloy's article, first published in issue number 27 of Currents (November 2008). --
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